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How important is public investment in infrastructure for development?   
Answers to this question vary broadly among economists.  A long tradition in 
the study of development gives the provision of a broad array of public goods 
and services, among them the provision of infrastructure, a central role in the 
solution of collective action problems and in the generation of the necessary 
conditions for self-sustaining economic growth to be in place.  An alternative 
view, however, has emphasized the scope for rent-seeking in the 
determination of public investment, and the resulting low social returns to a 
n u m b e r  o f  i n v e s t m e n t  p r o j e c t s  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r y  
governments. 
Determining the quantitative significance of the efficiency effects from 
infrastructure investment is a key question for the design of adjustment 
policies in developing countries.  Governments enacting fiscal adjustments 
have to face the question of how much to cut public investment vis-à-vis 
current expenditures.  Cutting current expenditures often entails laying off 
public sector workers and cutting the operating expenditures of the existing 
state structure.  As such, it can be a politically complex decision.  In contrast, 
reducing public investment projects may simply entail not undertaking new 
investment projects that have yet to be initiated and thus do not have a 
political constituency to support them.  It is thus no surprise that 
governments facing public adjustment programs often decide to maintain current expenditures and significantly curtail public investment (World Bank, 
1988, Roubini and Sachs, 1989). 
When fiscal deficits are reduced by cutting productive public investments, 
the resulting fiscal adjustment will be illusory in that it does not take into 
account the reduction in government net worth arising from the lost revenues 
caused by the lower expected future national income (Easterly, 1998).  This 
phenomenon has been recently studied for the case of Latin American 
economies by Easterly and Servén (2003).  The articles in that book 
emphasize the cost to Latin America of the severe cutbacks in public 
investment in infrastructure that occurred during the fiscal adjustments of the 
eighties and nineties. 
A fiscal adjustment will only be illusory, however, if the curtailed 
investment in infrastructure actually has significant effects on private sector 
productivity.  If the project in question is a white elephant, cutting it is most 
likely to be the best fiscal policy one can follow.  For the same reason, it is 
important to be able to identify the effect of infrastructure investment on 
productivity in an economic and not just in a statistical sense, to understand 
how large the expected effect of a cutback in infrastructure investment on 
government net worth and expected economic growth will be.   
Estimating these effects, however, presents a daunting empirical problem.  
Precisely because of the political forces in action to determine the allocation of 
investment projects, spending on infrastructure is likely to be an endogenous 
variable, making identification of its effect on productivity growth difficult.   If 
governments are more likely to invest in prosperous and economically developed regions, then there will be a spurious positive correlation between 
investment in infrastructure and productivity growth; if policymakers try to 
use public investment to compensate for the backwardness of existing regions 
or to help out regions in crisis, in contrast, there will be a downward bias in 
the least squares estimate of the effect of infrastructure investment on 
productivity growth.  It will be extremely difficult to find exogenous and 
excludable instruments for investment in infrastructure.  For example, 
Calderón and Servén (2003) have used urban population and population 
densities as well as lagged values of infrastructure stocks to estimate the effect 
of infrastructure on per worker GDP.  However, if investment in 
infrastructure is endogenous lagged infrastructure will be correlated with 
productivity shocks if these are persistent while the population and 
population densities may have a direct effect on production. 
This paper addresses the question of endogeneity in the estimation of the 
effect of public infrastructure spending on productivity by using state-level 
variations in infrastcructure investments carried out by the Venezuelan 
Intergubernmental Decentralization Fund (Fondo Intergubernamental para la 
Descentralización) established in 1993 to finance local infrastructure projects 
carried out by state and municipal governments in Venezuela.  The FIDES 
was created simultaneously with the approval of a 1993 law establishing a 
national value-added tax on goods and services.  The political negotiation 
leading to the adoption of the law led the Velásquez administration to accept 
to distribute 15% of collected VAT revenues directly to state and municipal 
governments, with the condition that these resources be devoted to investment projects that would be co-financed with the local government’s 
own resources.  Since its creation, the 15% rate has remained constant. 
What is interesting about FIDES for our purposes is that it establishes that 
each state and local government receive a fraction of total national VAT 
revenues that is a function of its population, its territorial extension, and its 
initial level of development. The variation in FIDES-financed expenditures 
over time is thus a result of the interaction between this rule and changes in 
national tax collection.   Both of these are clearly exogenous to state-level 
productivity (at after one controls for common nation-level productivity 
shocks by the introduction of time dummies).  This variable is thus an ideal 
indicator of exogenous changes in infrastructure investment. 
The rest of this paper proceeds ad follows.  Section 2 describes the FIDES 
as well as its companion law, the Ley de Asignaciones Económicas Especiales 
(LAEE).  Section 3 discusses our empirical methodology and some issues with 
our estimation strategy.  Section 4 presents our results.  Section 5 concludes. 
2.  The Intergubernmental Decentralization Fund and the 
Special Economic Assigments Law. 
  The Intergubernmental Decentralization Fund, which we will refer to by 
its Spanish acronym FIDES (Fondo Intergubernamental para la 
Descentralización)  was created in November of 1993 as a result of the political 
discussion regarding the institution of  the value added tax in Venezuela.  The 
VAT reform, originally introduced by the Carlos Andrés Pérez administration 
before congress in 1989, had met significant political opposition and had been 
sidetracked in Congress.  When Pérez was impeached in 1993, the caretaker administration of Ramón Velásquez negotiated with Congress the approval of this 
law, subject to the proviso that 15% of VAT revenues would be directly allocated 
to regional governments for the carrying out of public investments. 
  The law contemplates a broad definition of areas in which the FIDES may 
serve to pay the cost of public investments.  Particularly important is the list of 
areas in which these investments can be financed by FIDES, which includes   
“Projects of productive investment that promote the sustainable development of 
the community, states and municipalities; works of infrastructure and activities 
within the framework of national development plans” (FIDES, 2005, Article 22) 
Although these provisions allow for a broad definition of the type of investment 
projects, the law does specifically state that these resources must only be used for 
“programas y proyectos” (programs and projects), a term that in Venezuelan 
legislation is equivalent to capital expenditures.  Projects typically financed 
include construction of schools, repairs to roads and acquisition of vehicles for 
use by the local police force.    
  The fact that these resources are indeed devoted to public investment 
projects may have to do more with the organizational details of the fund than 
with the letter of the law.  Indeed, the 1999 Venezuelan constitution also requires 
states to devote at least 50% of their state revenues towards public investment, 
but no state in Venezuela currently obeys this prescription.  The FIDES law, 
however, requires the directory of the fund to approve the list of investment 
projects and to only disburse the funds after approval and subject to 
coparticipation of the state or local government in funding the project.   The FIDES law is somewhat similar in structure to the Law of Special 
Economic Assignments (Ley de Asignaciones Económicas Especiales or LAEE), 
approved in 1996, which provides for states to receive 25% of government 
revenues derived from royalties on oil production.  LAEE emerged out of a 
distinct political phenomenon, which was the set of negotiations undertaken by 
the Caldera (1993-1998) administration in seeking to gain the support of a 
working majority in Congress and the resulting concessions to te political forces 
of oil-producing states.  Three oil producing states (Anzoátegui, Monagas and 
Zulia) receive 70% of the revenues assigned according to LAEE, whereas the 
remaining 20 states divide up the other 30%.  The main distinction between 
LAEE and FIDES is that the former is much more targeted in the type of 
investment projects that can be financed through it. (A second distinction is that 
the approval and supervision of projects occurs within the Ministry of Interior 
and Justice and not by an autonomously run entity like FIDES, making standards 
much laxer).  It is interesting to look at the list of projects that the LAEE law 
specifically restricts expenditures to: 
1.  Projects linked to counteracting the adverse environmental impact of 
minig and hydrocarbons production. 
2.  Financing of research and technological innovation. 
3.  Medical and educational infrastructure 
4.  Cultural preservation 
5.  Construction of homes for low and middle-income families 
6.  Construction and improvement of agricultural infrastructure, including 
roads that serve the agricultural sector In contrast to FIDES, LAEE is not open-ended but quite restricted in its 
application.  More importantly, investment of LAEE resources in non-
agricultural infrastructure is not permitted by the law.  The type of public goods 
and services that can be provided by LAEE, while important for welfare and 
human capital accumulation, should not have a very strong link with the 
productivity of the manufacturing sector.  This fact will be key to our analysis. 
3.  Empirical Strategy 
 
 
We will use a panel of manufacturing firms derived from the National 
Institute of Statistics’ Encuesta Industrial to estimate the effect of FIDES and 
LAEE-financed public investment on firm-level productivity between 1996 
and 2001.  We will estimate a firm-level production function: 
it it it it it a l k y ω α α α α + + + + = 3 2 1 0       ( 1 )  
Where yit is the log of real value added, kit is the log of the capital stock, lit 
is employment, and ait is the log of the firm’s age measured in years.  ωit is the 
firm level productivity, which is determined according to: 
it it i it p ε β η ω + + =         ( 2 )  
So that firm-level productivity is composed by a firm-specific effect, the 
productivity effect of the stock of public infrastructure, pit  and a white noise 
term. 
We do not observe the stock of public infrastructure.  However, we do 
know that it evolves according to: t it it i p p + − = −1 ) 1 ( δ         ( 3 )  
Where  δ is the rate of depreciation and it is public investment in 
infrastructure.  Let public investment in infrastructure be the sum of FIDES 
and non-FIDES investment (based on the discussion in section 2, we assume 
that no investment in the infrastructure that is relevant for manufacturing 
sector productivity comes from LAEE).  The availability of greater resources 
from FIDES will impact public investment in infrastructure in two ways.  First 
of all, according to the FIDES law, states must put down a minimum share of 
their own resources towards financing of these projects.  Furthermore, the 
availability of FIDES may allow state governments to carry out projects that 
they would not otherwise have carried out with their own resources.  On the 
other hand, states may simply use FIDES to carry out projects that they would 
have carried out anyway, so that the availability of FIDES resources may 
reduce non-FIDES investment.  The total effect of FIDES resources on 
investment may thus be greater than or less than one.  We summarize it in the 
multiplier γ, so that investment in infrastructure is: 
) ( 0 0 i it it it it it n n n f n f i − + + = + = γ γ        ( 4 )  
Where fit is FIDES (or FIDES-induced) investment, nit is infrastructure 
investment that is unrelated to FIDES and ni0 is its unconditional mean E(nit).  
Note that since δfit  includes the direct and indirect effect of FIDES 
expenditures, nit is by definition uncorrelated with fit. 
Taking first-differences of (2) and using (3) and (4) gives us: 
1 0 1 0 1 ) 1 ( ) ( − − − − + + − + + − − = − it it i it it it i i it it n n f n ε βδ ε β βγ βδω βδη β ω ω  (5) Equation (5) tells us that changes in productivity are a combination of five 
terms: a firm-specific fixed effect  i i n βδη β − 0 , a “convergence” effect  1 − − it βδω  
that depends on the initial level of productivity and is caused by the 
depreciation of public infrastructure, the effect of FIDES investment, 
captured by  it f βγ , and a linear combination of white-noise terms 
1 0 ) 1 ( ) ( − − + + − it it it n n ε βδ ε β  that can be treated as a ole disturbance.  This gives 
rise to the specification that we will present in the following section: 
it i it it it v f a a a + + + + = − χ ω ω 2 1 1 0        ( 6 )  
where the expected value of a2 equals βγ and is positive. Note that fit is 
uncorrelated with the error term vit, , so that a2 can be estimated consistently 
by panel methods as long as the fixed effect χi   is differenced away. 
Equation (6) represents a dynamic panel that can be estimated by the 
techniques of Arellano and Bond (1991).  An alternative and simpler 
specification arises if we are willing to assume that the depreciation rate of 
public infrastructure is negligible.  Here (5) becomes: 
it i it it it v f b b + + + = − − χ ω ω 2 0 1        ( 7 )  
Which can be estimated through a conventional fixed-effects estimator. 
In practice, our estimation strategy will be carried out in two steps.  In the 
first step we will estimate ωit  by the Olley-Pakes (1996) semi-parametric 
method that allows to obtain consistent estimates of α0,α1,α2 and α3 that take 
into account the endogenous determination of firm-level capital and its likely 
correlation with productivity shocks arising from two forces: (i) the fact that 
firms that experience a positive productivity shock are likely to invest more, and (ii) the fact that firms that experience a positive productivity shock are 
less likely to exit.  The Olley-Pakes methodology consists of three steps.  In the 
first step, we estimate the production function semi-parametrically as a 
function of kit,lit,ait  and private investment cit.   The basic ideas is that since 
investment is an increasing function of productivity then controlling for 
private investment will allow us to recover a consistent estimate of the 
coefficient on lit.  In the second step we estimate the probability of survival as 
a non-parametric function of kit,ait,and  cit.  Using this estimate of the 
probability of survival, we can control for selection bias effects and estimate 
the production function coefficients on kit and ait by non-linear least squares.  
When we have all the parameter estimates for (1) we can simply calculate ωit  
and go on to estimate (6) and (7) though an Arellano-Bond and a fixed-effects 
estimator. 
4.  Estimation Results 
Table 1 shows the results of our baseline estimation of equations (6) 
and (7).  All estimates include a set of year dummies.   The dependent variable 
is constructed as outlined in the previous section; the dependent variable is 
the log of FIDES revenues over Gross State Product.  The latter is estimated 
using UNDP’s (various years) estimates of state-level income. The baseline 
estimation produces significant estimates of the effect of FIDES investment 
on productivity.  The estimates indicate that a 1 percent increase in FIDES 
expenditures will lead to an increase of 0.2-.3 percent in firm-level 
productivity.  The lagged productivity term is highly significant, favoring the 
specification of equation (6).  The third and fourth column of Table 6 include a control for LAEE expenditures. As mentioned above, we do not expect 
LAEE-financed investments to have a significant effect on productivity in the 
manufacturing sector, but it is worth testing whether they do or not.   
Furthermore, LAEE could affect the incentives for investment in non-FIDES 
induced manufacturing-relevant public sector infrastructure nit.  Even if the 
effect of LAEE is statistically insignificant, controlling for it may still be 
relevant for obtaining an accurate estimator of the FIDES effect.  The reason 
is that the allocation rules for LAEE are very similar to those of FIDES, so that 
we may expect changes over time in both of these types of expenditures to be 
correlated.  Even a small coefficient of LAEE in the productivity regression 
could then be consistent with a substantial omitted-variable bias term.  The 
first-differenced regression does indeed display a significant increase in the 
estimated coefficient, from .20 to .35, while the Arellano-Bond regression 
displays a statistically negligible increase. 
As noted in the previous section, implementation of the Olley-Pakes 
algorithm requires estimation of a survival probability function.  In order to 
do this, it is necessary to have data on entry and exit of firms.  However, the 
Encuesta Industrial is a random survey in which a firm may exit the sample 
because it is no longer operating or because it was no longer surveyed.  When 
estimating survival probabilities, we take advantage of the fact that in the 
Encuesta Industrial’s sample all plants of more than 100 employees are 
always covered.  In other words, the Encuesta becomes a census for plants 
with more than 100 employees.  We thus estimate the survival probability 
function for firms with more than 100 employees and then use the coefficients from that function to correct for selection bias for all firms.  Note that this 
simply relies on the implicit assumption made when one estimates the 
production function (1) for the whole sample, which is that small and large 
firms have the same parameters in this production function.  However, the 
doubt may naturally arise about how important is the approximation error 
induced by this method.  In Table 2 we present the results of carrying out all 
three steps (instead of just the second one) of the Olley-Pakes algorithnm 
restricted to plants of more than 100 employees.  The number of observations 
falls to roughly one-third of those used in the exercise with the whole sample, 
and there is a consequent loss in the statistical precision of the estimates.  On 
the other hand, all coefficients remain positive, two of them experimenting 
substantial increases in the point estimate, with one of them significant at 5% 
and two others with borderline p-values.  Even the lowest point estimate of 
Table 2 (0.18) implies an economically significant effect on productivity of 
increased allocations to FIDES. 
The estimates presented to this moment tell us nothing about the way in 
which the effect of FIDES expenditures operate.  What firms are more likely to 
reap the benefits of greater investment in public infrastructure?  One can 
attempt to answer this question by noting that public investment can raise 
productivity by providing goods and services that private sector firms were 
incapable or unwilling to provide on their own.  They may have been 
incapable of doing so because they were liquidity constrained, or they may 
have been unwilling to because of collective action problems.  Firms that have 
greater access to capital are likely to be less liquidity constrained, so we can test this hypothesis by testing whether less capital-intensive firms benefit less 
from public investment.  Exporters are also likely to have greater access to 
international capital markets and thus we may expect exporting firms to 
benefit less from public investment in infrastructure.  Firms with 
international ownership will also likely have access to credit through their 
foreign partners, so that we may also expect them to benefit less from public 
investment.  We would also expect the payoff from public goods provision to 
be higher in economically less developed regions, in which the marginal 
product of both private and public capital should be higher. 
We test each of these hypotheses in turn in the regressions reported in 
Tables 3-6.  Table 3 introduces an interaction with capital intensity.  As 
hypothesized, capital-intensive firms benefit less from public investment in 
infrastructure, with the interaction term being significant in all four 
specifications (one at 10%, two at 5% and one at 1%).  Adding in an interaction 
with exports in Table 4 also delivers a significant coefficient estimate in all 
four specifications (two at 5% and two at 1%).  Meanwhile, both the direct 
effect of FIDES investment and the interaction with capital intensity remain 
strongly significant. 
Evidence on the effects of the level of development and domestic 
ownership are more mixed.  Only two of the four coefficient estimates on the 
interaction between FIDES investment and the log of state per capita income 
are significant at 10%, and one of them has the wrong sign.  However, this 
may be a very rough measure of the level of development, given that it is 
measured only at the state level and relies on imprecise estimates of per capita income (there are no official Gross State Product data in Venezuela).  An 
interaction with domestic ownership does display a positive coefficient, as 
hypothesized (Table 6) but is significant in just two of the four estimates (one 
at 10%, one at 1%).  However, in both regressions in which the control for 
domestic ownership is significant, the direct effect of FIDES on productivity 
growth loses its significance, although the interaction terms remain 
significant.  These include what is arguably the best specification in column 4, 
which controls for lagged productivity and for omitted variable bias coming 
from the effect of LAEE on public investment.  This would imply that the 
effect of FIDES investment on productivity is explained by its effect on the 
productivity of labor intensive firms, non-exporters and domestically owned 
firms. 
5.  Concluding Comments 
This paper has used expenditures of the Venezuelan Intergubernmental 
Decentralization Fund (FIDES) to estimate the effect of public infrastructure 
investment on the productivity of Venezuelan manufacturing firms.  Because 
FIDES allocations are assigned to states through a rule that divides national 
VAT receipts according to the states’ population, territorial expansion and 
initial level of development, and as that rule has remained remarkably stable 
over time, changes in FIDES expenditures basically come from the interaction 
between the parameters of the allocation rule and changes in national tax 
collection.  This effect is exogenous at the state level and also generates 
sufficient variation over time so as to allow us to estimate its effect on firm-
level productivity. Our estimates indicate that a 1% increase in the allocation to FIDES 
expenditures generates an increase in productivity of the manufacturing 
sector between .2 and .35.  Economically, this is a very significant effect.   
FIDES investment in 2006 is projected to amount to 1.7 trillion Bs., or 
roughly 0.75% of GDP.  A 1% increase would thus amount to an additional 
allocation of 0.0075% of GDP.  Given that manufacturing accounts for 17% of 
GDP, a 0.2% increase in value added in manufacturing would imply an 
increase of 0.034% of GDP.  At the going VAT tax rate of 15%, this implies 
that the government would recover .0054% of GDP in additional tax receipts, 
or 72% of the initial investment every year.  Cutting investment in 
infrastructure does appear to be a very bad deal both from a fiscal viewpoint 
as well as from the perspective of society as a whole. References 
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Lagged Productivity  0.368547    0.355316 
   8.59***   7.35*** 
FIDES 0.19643  0.315318  0.346379  0.330087 
 2.07**  3.41***  1.99**  1.87* 
LAEE     0.014325  0.029532 
     0.27  0.74 
Constant -0.24681  -0.1241  -0.3031  -0.12417 
 -2.12**  -8.37***  -1.7*  -7.03*** 
Method Fixed  Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Fixed Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 8865  5366  7239  4038 
R2 0.049868   0.064626   
T-statistics below coefficient estimates. Asterisks denote significance levels: *-
10%, **-5%, *** -1%.  











       
Lagged Productivity  0.311162    0.301269 
   5.78***   5.00*** 
FIDES 0.18406  0.265771  0.535811 0.468291 
 1.28  1.68*  2.35**  1.61 
LAEE     0.054386  0.057973 
     0.73  1.19 
Constant -0.69037  0.000796  -0.45258  0.004448 
 -4.62***  0.03  -2.1**  0.15 
Method Fixed  Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Fixed Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 2739  2083  2261  1635 
R2 0.058908   0.07758   
T-statistics below coefficient estimates. Asterisks denote significance levels: *-
10%, **-5%, *** -1%.  











       
Lagged Productivity  0.363076    0.351925 
   8.56***   7.35*** 
FIDES 0.203816  0.319992  0.369614 0.35682 
  2.16** 3.48***  2.14** 2.02** 
FIDES*(K/L) -0.00039  -.0004302 -0.00052  -0.00048 
 -2.76***  -2.31**  -2.19**  -1.93* 
LAEE     0.017383  0.031257 
     0.33  0.79 
Constant -0.23112  -0.10803  -0.30326  -0.12152 
 -1.98**  -2.7***  -1.71*  -6.9*** 
Method Fixed  Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Fixed Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 8865  5366  7239  4038 
R2 0.052276   0.067918   
T-statistics below coefficient estimates. Asterisks denote significance levels: *-
10%, **-5%, *** -1%.  
Table 4: Interaction with firm exports   
Dependent Variable  Change  in 
Productivity 
Productivity Change  in 
Productivity 
Productivity 
        
Lagged Productivity  0.358281    0.354163 
   8.49***    7.40*** 
FIDES 0.213278  0.338368  0.350838  0.372646 
 2.26**  3.70***  2.03**  2.13** 
FIDES*(K/L) -0.00039  -0.00043  -0.00052  -0.00049 
 -2.77***  -2.24**  -2.18**  -1.94* 
FIDES*(Exports/Production) -0.34967  -0.46586  -0.3962  -0.70253 
 -2.29**  -2.91***  -1.98**  -2.75*** 
LAEE     0.017546  0.029071 
     0.34  0.74 
Constant -0.21614  -0.11684  -0.25508  -0.1188 
 -1.85*  -7.9***  -1.44  -6.75*** 
Method Fixed  Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Fixed Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 8865  5366  7239  4038 
R2 0.054723    0.07098   
T-statistics below coefficient estimates. Asterisks denote significance levels: *-
10%, **-5%, *** -1%.  
Table 5: Interaction with state per capita income 
Dependent Variable  Change  in 
Productivity 
Productivity Change  in 
Productivity 
Productivity 
        
Lagged Productivity  0.357693    0.354238 
   8.48***    7.4*** 
FIDES 0.281627  0.379318  0.337159  0.367933 
 2.72***  4.05***  1.95*  2.09** 
FIDES*(K/L) -0.0004  -0.00044  -0.00051  -0.00049 
 -2.82***  -2.27**  -2.15**  -1.94* 
FIDES*(Exports/Production) -0.34806  -0.46225  -0.39596  -0.70245 
 -2.28**  -2.89***  -1.97**  -2.75*** 
FIDES*(State per Capita 
Income (Log)) 
-0.16161 -0.14648  0.179727  -0.01399 
 -1.66*  -1.74*  0.99  -0.1 
LAEE     0.042036  0.027768 
     0.71  0.63 
Constant -0.21167  -0.11107  -0.34074  -0.11864 
 -1.81*  -7.19***  -1.74*  -6.54*** 
Method Fixed  Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Fixed Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 8865  5366  7239  4038 
R2 0.055228    0.071216   
T-statistics below coefficient estimates. Asterisks denote significance levels: *-
10%, **-5%, *** -1%.  
Table 6: Interaction with ownership of residents 
Dependent Variable  Change  in 
Productivity 
Productivity Change  in 
Productivity 
Productivity 
        
Lagged Productivity  0.358062    0.35799 
   8.52***    7.5*** 
FIDES 0.251949  0.301163  0.206531  0.174466 
 2.18**  2.82***  1.09  0.93 
FIDES*(K/L) -0.0004  -0.00043  -0.0005  -0.00048 
 -2.79***  -2.24**  -2.1**  -1.93* 
FIDES*(Exports/Production) -0.34593  -0.46  -0.39377  -0.70606 
 -2.27**  -2.88***  -1.96**  -2.78*** 
FIDES*(State per Capita 
Income (Log)) 
-0.15947 -0.13478  0.222212  0.023893 
 -1.64  -1.59  1.22  0.17 
FIDES*(Percent Ownership 
Residents) 
0.000294 0.000745  0.000953 0.001297 
 0.6  1.65  1.68*  2.73*** 
LAEE     0.043304  0.028027 
     0.73  0.64 
Constant -0.64445  -0.09816  -0.31592  -0.09251 
 -5.57***  -5.66***  -1.61  -4.53*** 
Method Fixed  Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Fixed Effects  Arellano-
Bond 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 8864  5365  7238  4037 
R2 0.055309    0.07208   
T-statistics below coefficient estimates. Asterisks denote significance levels: *-
10%, **-5%, *** -1%. 
 